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INTRODUCTION
In July of 2015, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The
Hague held a hearing over the dispute between the Philippines and
China over territory in the South China Sea. On the third day of the
hearing, the Court’s website suddenly went offline, an event which
turned out to be the result of a cyberattack that originated in China.
The hackers had infected the site with malware, making it so that
anyone who visited the site was subject to data theft.1 With
cyberattacks becoming increasingly more prevalent in all sectors of
society, even a highly publicized and contentious international
arbitration unfolding in the public eye was not immune.
Cybersecurity is in fact becoming increasingly relevant in the
context of arbitration, which continues to be a popular choice of
conflict resolution for parties involved in complex and sensitive
international disputes. In these types of disputes, digital discovery is
inevitable and may include confidential information including trade
secrets, financial information, and personally identifiable information.

* Mr. Pastore is a litigation partner at Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, where his practice
focuses on cybersecurity and data privacy matters, as well as intellectual property litigation.
Mr. Pastore served for more than five years as an Assistant United States Attorney in the
Southern District of New York, where he prosecuted a number of cybercrimes cases including
United States v. Monsegur, a/k/a “Sabu”; Operation Cardshop; Operation Dirty R.A.T., and
the Rove Digital organization as part of Operation Ghost Click. I wish to thank my associates,
Max Shaul and Michael Brady, for their important contributions to this article.
1. Jason Healey & Anni Piiparinen, Did China Just Hack the International Court
Adjudicating Its South China Sea Territorial Claims?, DIPLOMAT (Oct. 27, 2015),
http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/did-china-just-hack-the-international-court-adjudicating-itssouth-china-sea-territorial-claims/; China Hacks the Peace Palace: All Your EEZ’s Are Belong
to Us, THREATCONNECT (July 20, 2015), https://www.threatconnect.com/blog/china-hacksthe-peace-palace-all-your-eezs-are-belong-to-us/; David Tweed, China’s Cyber Spies Take to
High Seas as Hack Attacks Spike, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Oct. 15 2015),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-15/chinese-cyber-spies-fish-for-enemiesin-south-china-sea-dispute.
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Despite the sensitivity surrounding such proceedings—where, unlike
federal litigation in the United States, even the very existence of the
arbitration may be highly confidential—cybersecurity has received
perhaps less attention than it might deserve. Part I of this Essay
explores the nature of the cybersecurity threat to arbitrations; Part II
sets forth a few guiding principles that can be used to frame how to
think about cybersecurity and the closely related field of data privacy;
and Part III suggests practical steps that those involved in arbitrations
might take to enhance cybersecurity and prevent violations of
international data privacy laws.
I.

UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT

Though hackers have proven to come in all shapes and sizes—
from the so-called 400-pound man on the bed in his parents’
basement2 to highly sophisticated state-backed campaigns designed to
influence political processes3—we suggest that they can be classified
into three broad categories: hacktivists, state actors, and criminal
actors motivated by financial gain. To be clear, these categories are
not hard and fast, nor are they impermeable. A state actor could be
motivated by financial gain (e.g., stealing intellectual property of
manufacturers to establish competing plants in the home country4) or
by ideological goals (e.g., distributed-denial-of-service (“DDoS”)
attacks launched against financial institutions in the United States5).
The purpose of grouping the threats is not to exhaustively categorize
the types of attacks, but rather to help build a framework that may be
useful in identifying where attackers may be likely to strike.

2. Elizabeth Weise, Tech crowd goes wild for Trump’s ‘400-pound hacker’, USA TODAY
(Sept. 27, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/09/27/tech-crowd-goes-wildtrumps-400-pound-hacker/91168144/.
3. Damian Paletta, U.S. Blames Russia for Recent Hacks, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-blames-russia-for-recent-hacks-1475870371.
4. Erin Ailworth, Chinese firm charged with stealing tech from Mass. Company, BOS.
GLOBE (June 27, 2013), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2013/06/27/feds-chargechinese-firm-with-stealing-technology-mass-companyamsc/CTE66TzhtD19qvEfU35RQN/
story.html.
5. Ellen Nakashima & Matt Zapotosky, U.S. Charges Iran-Linked Hackers With
Targeting Banks, N.Y. Dam, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/world/national-security/justice-department-to-unseal-indictment-against-hackers-linked-toiranian-goverment/2016/03/24/9b3797d2-f17b-11e5-a61f-e9c95c06edca_story.html?utm_
term=.f7f4ce2791b3.
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A. Hacktivists
The term “hacktivist”—a portmanteau of “hacker” and “activist”
—nicely captures the motivations of this often-unpredictable group.
Simply put, they seek to hack not for financial gain, but instead to
promote or further a social or political cause. These hackers may seek
to use personal information to embarrass their targets, or launch
disruptive attacks designed to harm their targets or draw attention to
their behavior. One of the most famous examples of a hacktivist is
Hector Xavier Monsegur, known as “Sabu,” the founder of the
international hacker group “Lulzsec,” that became famous for a series
of well-publicized publicity stunts and DDoS attacks on religious,
government, and corporate websites including Visa, Paypal, and
Mastercard. As part of a plea deal in 2012, Monsegur cooperated with
government investigators and helped build a case against the five
other hackers.6 Parties of arbitration should be aware that these
groups exist and should be cognizant of whether they might be
transferring any information that could be of interest to these socially
motivated hackers.
B. State Actors
Hackers who are arguably the most difficult to mitigate against
are state actors. In May of 2014, the Justice Department indicted five
members of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army under charges of
hacking into the networks of Westinghouse Electric, the US Steel
Corporation, and other companies, copying their emails, installing
malware, and generally stealing intellectual property and other
information useful to their competitors in China, including stateowned enterprises (“SOEs”). These five men were identified as
members of Unit 61398, the Shanghai-based cyber unit of the
People’s Liberation Army and home to various identifiable online
hackers. These charges represent the first indictment of a state actor in

6. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Six Hackers in the United States and Abroad
Charged for Crimes Affecting Over One Million Victims (Mar. 6, 2012),
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/newyork/press-releases/2012/six-hackers-in-the-united-statesand-abroad-charged-for-crimes-affecting-over-one-million-victims); Susan Candiotti, Five
Arrested In High-Profile Cyberattacks, CNN (Mar. 7, 2012), http://edition.
cnn.com/2012/03/06/us/new-york-hacker-arrests/.
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a cyberattack.7 Though not directly related to arbitration, this case
involved the commercially motivated theft of intellectual property,
information that can often be found in the discovery stages of
arbitration proceedings.8 It is thus important for parties to arbitration
to recognize if the information they are sharing in discovery may
include matters of interest to state actors conducting economic
espionage.
C. Financially Motivated Criminals
The final category of cyber attackers is criminal actors. These
hackers are usually interested primarily in commercial gain. To give a
recent example, in March of 2016, a Russian hacker located in the
Ukraine listed forty-six elite US law firms as targets in a phishing
attack aimed at retrieving confidential information of clients to sell
for purposes of insider trading.9 Law firms, which store large amounts
of confidential information about clients, are just one example of the
types of entities targeted by criminal actors who seek to turn a profit
off of stolen data. Given that arbitration often involves the
transmission of sensitive commercial information that others might
use for profit, parties to arbitration should be particularly cognizant of
the threat of these types of hackers.

7. Press Release, Department of Justice, U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for
Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial
Advantage (May 19, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-militaryhackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor; Michael S. Schmidt, 5 in China
Army Face U.S. Charges of Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/us/us-to-charge-chinese-workers-with-cyberspying.html
?_r=1; Devlin Barrett & Siobham Gorman, U.S. Charges Five in Chinese Army With Hacking,
WALL ST. J. (May 19, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023044227
04579571604060696532.
8. See, e.g., Thomas Fox-Brewster, U.S Accuses 7 Iranians of Cyberattacks on Banks
(Mar.
24,
2016),
and
Dam,
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2016/03/24/iran-hackers-charged-bank-ddosattacks-banks/#623b95417f8d. State actors might also engage in hacking as a form of cyber
warfare or a terror attack but this activity is less of a risk in arbitration. Id.
9. Claire Bushey, Russian Cyber Criminal Targets Elite Chicago Law Firms, CRAIN’S
CHI. BUS. (Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20160329/NEW
S04/160329840/russian-cyber-criminal-targets-elite-chicago-law-firms; Booz Allen Hamilton,
Inc., Cyberthreats to Law Firms, CYBER4SIGHT 6-7 (Apr. 14, 2016), http://m.boozallen.com/
content/dam/boozallen/documents/2016/05/Cyberthreats%20to%20Law%20Firms_new_heade
r.pdf.
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II. TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK: GUIDING PRINCIPLES
The examples above constitute only a tiny portion of the
cyberattacks that can occur. The imperative to prevent the harms
outlined above may seem self-evident, but the law also suggests that,
aside from staving off reputational harm, there are affirmative
obligations on both the tribunal and the parties appearing before it to
pay heed to cybersecurity and take steps to protect client confidences
in the digital world. For example, the Florida Bar Rules of
Professional Conduct 4-1.1 states, “Competent representation also
involves safeguarding confidential information relating to the
representation, including, but not limited to, electronic transmissions
and communications,” and many other state bar associations use
similar language surrounding precautions for cyber security.10 By
establishing procedures for the storage and transfer of sensitive
information at the outset of arbitration proceedings, the parties and
the tribunal may greatly mitigate the risk of future threats.
Before identifying the specific steps that practitioners may take
to discharge what is increasingly viewed as an ethical duty and what
is, at a minimum, a need to mitigate reputational risk, it is helpful to
consider guiding principles for formulating the specific procedures
that may be adopted in any particular matter. We suggest here that
cybersecurity—and, relatedly, data privacy concerns—can most
effectively be addressed once the practitioner knows her “assets” and
“architecture.” That is, the sensitive information that one has (e.g.,
customer lists of a client; sensitive trade secrets developed through
substantial R&D expenditures; potentially market-moving
information about future business plans) and where one stores it (e.g.,
with a third-party cloud provider; on portable (and easily lost)
external media like thumb drives; on networks accessible by other
practitioners in the firm without regard to whether they need access to
such data).
Though this process may sound simple, it often poses unforeseen
challenges, particularly for the practitioner who practices in a large
firm where information decisions (such as where and how to store
information digitally) often are made with little or no input from the
practicing attorneys, but are instead delegated to information staff
10. In re: Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar 4-1.1 & 6-10.3, 200 So. 3d 1225
(Fla. 2016); see also CA Eth. Op. 2010, Cal. St. Bar. Comm. Prof. Resp., 179 (2010); NY Eth.
Op. 1019, N.Y. St. Bar. Assn. Comm. Prof. Eth. (2014).
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whose primary focus is on keeping the data readily accessible. Indeed,
in many ways, there is a tension between the cybersecurity concerns
that have been pushed to the fore and the “always available”
mentality that permeates law firm and law firm client expectations.
Layered on top of the cybersecurity concerns is the closely
related field of data privacy. Even now, many information technology
staff (and, perhaps, more than a few lawyers) remain only vaguely
aware of data privacy laws—most prominently in the European
Union—that forbid the exportation of sensitive data from the
European Union to jurisdictions viewed as less secure, including,
most notably, the United States. It is therefore possible that an
entirely innocent measure taken by an information technologist (e.g.,
the transfer of data from a full server in London to an available one in
the United States) may trigger liability for the practitioner.11 Thus, it
is helpful to identify the critical data assets and the architecture used
to store them to effectively build procedures that satisfy both
cybersecurity and data privacy concerns.
III. CYBERSECURITY IN PRACTICE
Once the parties and the tribunal have assessed the assets and
architecture, the parties and the tribunal may then consider the
following three thematic principles with respect to the threat of
cyberattackers in the context of arbitration: (i) the establishment of
security protocols for the storage and transfer of sensitive
information, (ii) limiting of the disclosure of sensitive information,
and (iii) in the event of any breach/attack, the process for notifying
affected person(s) and for correcting/mitigating the breach/attack.
There are a variety of factors to consider when adopting security
protocols for the transfer of sensitive information. First, identifying
the categories of particularly sensitive information that merit
enhanced cybersecurity procedures is a useful practical step. The
reality is that much of cybersecurity fails because the mechanisms
used are too cumbersome or subject to human error. Accordingly,
trying to implement restrictive cybersecurity measures on all data
involved in an arbitration proceeding may be counterproductive in
11. Boris Segalis, Christoph Ritzer, & Andrew Hoffman, Hamburg DPA’s Safe Harbor
Fines Spell Further Uncertainty and Risk for Global Companies, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT
(June 8, 2016), http://www.dataprotectionreport.com/2016/06/hamburg-dpa-fines-three-com
panies-for-continued-reliance-on-safe-harbor/.
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that it over-designates information (desensitizing practitioners to the
truly critical information) and results in overly cumbersome processes
for information that, in reality, needs little to no additional
protections.
Once the key information is identified, procedures can be
developed for the transfer of sensitive information between and
among the tribunal and the parties. Such measures can include both
endorsement of specific processes, as well as prohibitions on riskier
procedures. For instance, particularly sensitive information might be
disclosed using a secure portal rather than commercial email accounts
that may be more easily subject to compromise. The parties who
believe that such procedures are necessary might specifically endorse
a secure portal platform (such as Accellion) while banning the use of
free email accounts (such as Gmail or Yahoo). At a minimum, the
parties may develop procedures whereby files containing sensitive
information are password protected (and the password is separately
transmitted through another channel, such as text messaging) when
sent to a commercially available free email account.
Parties may also wish to pay particular attention to the
vulnerabilities posed by frequent travel—a key concern for many
international arbitration practitioners who often work in jurisdictions
far from the home office and under less-than-ideal circumstances. For
instance, the use of portable media such as thumb drives or locally
stored copies of documents on laptop computers can pose significant
risks if those easily portable media are lost, or worse, stolen by a bad
actor intent on exploiting the information contained therein. For that
reason, parties can consider the adoption of encryption standards for
portable media so that, even if the drive or computer is lost or stolen,
the data on it is nonetheless likely to remain secure. If the sensitivity
of the data warrants it, parties also may choose to outright ban the
local storage of such documents on easily lost media. Travel also
poses risks for insecure networks accessed through public WiFi spots
that may encourage snooping and data capture. Parties may consider a
potential prohibition against the use of public WiFi to access sensitive
information unless appropriate measures (e.g., use of VPN) are taken.
The second principle for mitigation of the threat of
cyberattackers in the context of arbitration is limiting the disclosure of
sensitive information. One way to minimize disclosure is to restrict
the access of certain information to only those persons having a “need
to know.” Limiting the number of persons accessing data reduces the
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potential for breach. Parties should also consider limiting the
submission of sensitive information to only that information which is
truly necessary for the arbitration.
In addition, we have recently seen the dramatic consequences of
the practice of maintaining decades-old records that have outlived
their useful life.12 An oft-repeated adage for cybersecurity
practitioners is that, “they can’t hack what you don’t have.” Like
mapping assets and architecture, however, this process may prove
more difficult than it appears at first blush. Practitioners find old
records useful as models or samples for future work product, so the
wholesale destruction of older records may not be feasible from a
business perspective. That being said, there are likely categories of
documents (e.g., exhibits listing personally identifying information)
that provide little or no future business value and can be destroyed
with little impact on the business.
Finally, parties to arbitration should be prepared in the event of
breach/attack, and thus may consider establishing the process for
notifying affected person(s) and for correcting/mitigating any
breach/attack. Ensuring that the parties have established policies and
procedures related to detecting breaches, determining their scope, and
notifying affected parties can help provide a clear path to follow if
and when a data breach occurs. These procedures can take many
forms but, at a minimum, it is helpful to identify a point-of-contact for
each party (and, in tribunals with multiple arbitrators, the tribunal)
responsible for coordinating communications in the event of a breach.
All constituents of an arbitration should remain cognizant of legal
obligations with respect to the reporting of any breach, whether to
affected parties, regulatory agencies, or other governmental
authorities. In this respect, international arbitration raises unique
concerns due to varying legal regimes, which may also differ on a
state-to-state basis.
CONCLUSION
As the frequency and sophistication of cyberattacks grow, so
will the commensurate risks to arbitration. Though the threat is likely
12. Rishi Iyengar, What to Know About the ‘Panama Papers’ Leak, TIME (Apr. 4, 2016),
http://time.com/4280302/panama-papers-leak-vladimir-putin-mossack-fonseca/.
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never to be eliminated, it can be mitigated. And accepting the
inevitable—that breaches have occurred (and will continue to
occur)—in connection with arbitrations can help practitioners
honestly explore the appropriate response to such breaches and how
they can be mitigated. If all involved in arbitral proceedings approach
these concerns with a shared sense of collective responsibility, we
suggest that real gains can be seen in preventing and mitigating harm
from the cybersecurity threat.
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